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THE INTERNATIONAL TAX EDITION:
WHAT IF SOMEDAY THE WHOLE GAME CHANGED?
by
Maria S. Domingo*

I. INTRODUCTION
, a miniseries streaming on Netflix,1
Gambit in chess tournaments.2

Long before the popular

an aggressive opening move by chess players.3 Gambit is
defined as a chess opening where a player risks the loss of one
or more pawns or pieces to obtain a tactical advantage in position
on the chessboard.4
temporarily sacrifice a pawn to gain control of the center of the
board. 5
Gambit are to accept, decline or play various defenses. During
the course of the miniseries, Beth is often seen visualizing the
chess board in her mind and both playing alternative offensive
countermoves and defenses. This visualization enables Beth to
actual gameplay (sometimes multiple opponents within a matter
*

Associate Professor, Department of Accounting, School of
Business, The College of New Jersey, Ewing, New Jersey
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her ability to anticipate and plan strategies that not only respond
to her opponent but eventually outwit them.
And so goes the world of global tax planning, where
ahead of the tax jurisdictions in their visualization of global tax
planning while tax jurisdictions have responded defensively to
these strategies. As reported by the news, the p
in chess has once again exploded because of the popularity of
the miniseries.6 Similarly, the global interest in base erosion
profit shifting, and more specifically, taxing digital giants has
grown to a fever pitch in recent years as governments struggle
to raise much needed tax revenue. Nations have alleged that
taxes and have done so by implementing aggressive tax
r
Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development
G20 Inclusive Framework7 have argued over whether to accept
the status quo, decline or play defensively. Amidst competing
interests during negotiations, countries have made concessions
to obtain an advantage or remove roadblocks toward a
multilateral global tax landscape.8 According to taxing
authorities, U.S. MNEs have been able to avoid tax on profits
planning strategies in jurisdictions where they had a substantial
economic presence with no corresponding tax nexus under
existing international tax rules (i.e.,
). As
tax revenue, nations have clamored and now have agreed in the
ntal
principles of the international tax system. However, finalizing
Pillar One globally and domestically may prove challenging as
it requires continued multilateral cooperation and domestic
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legislative approval, which begs the question as to whether
countries can move forward from an overarching agreement and
implementation plan to actual compliance, administration and
collection.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: Part II
provides background regarding the digital economy (which
sparked the movement toward international tax reform). Part III
explains the existing international tax principles of nexus and the
allocation of profits. Part IV discusses digital services taxes and
sions
of Pillar One and compares the Blueprint and OECD Statement
versions. Part VI discusses the impact of Pillar One on U.S. tax
policy. Lastly, Part VII concludes.
II. DIGITAL ECONOMY: A NEW BOARD AND A
NEW SET OF MOVES
Jurisdictions across the world are competing for what
pieces? Same pieces, with evolving rules and strategies. The
that part of economic output
derived solely or primarily from digital technologies with a
business model based on digital goods or services 9 Generally
speaking, the digital economy can include a variety of daily
activities or transactions that are interconnected by technology
such as computers, smart phones or other devices.10 The OECD
identified the following key attributes of the digital economy
and its resulting business models that are germane to
international tax policy
that is, mobility of intangible assets;
users and business functions; reliance on data, particularly,
-sided
business models (i.e., multiple groups interact via an
intermediary); monopoly or oligopoly of certain business
models; and volatility because of easier entry into the markets
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and rapidly changing technology.11 In recent years, a number
of jurisdictions have focused on the taxation of certain digital
activities and markets, which has led to contentious debates
between countries who seek and/or have imposed taxes on
digitalized businesses and those that seek to forestall such
efforts.
What Are These New Pieces: Common Characteristics of
Digitalized Businesses
Traditional brick and mortar stores and face-to-face
communication or interactions have given way to digital
technology. Most consumers choose the convenience of digital
platforms to socialize, share personal news and information
and/or shop for items ranging from necessities to luxury items
and everything in between. Consumers can make purchases and
complete transactions all from the comfort of their homes and
have products delivered directly to their doorstep within a matter
of hours or a few days. Because of the advances in information
and communication technology, digitalized companies can
operate different lines of business and reach a significantly
broader scale of consumers (than a traditional brick and mortar)
all the while surmounting vast global distances to complete
transactions.12 As a result of digital technology, companies have
developed digitalized business models in support of these digital
markets.
Digitalization has intensified the capacity of MNEs in
various industries to locate segments of their production process
in different countries across the globe while expanding its access
to consumers worldwide.13 As a result, MNEs have significantly
broadened their commercial reach and global customer base via
14

Neither time nor distance can
impede a digital transaction, and, thus, digitalized businesses
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that is,
digitalized businesses can significantly impact the economic life
of a jurisdiction without or with limited physical presence in a
country.15 Digitalized businesses have the following key
characteristics in common:16
Reliance on Intangible Assets:
Digitalized MNEs rely on intangible assets (primarily,
intellectual property that the MNE owns or leases from a third
party), which play an important role in their firm value and
output growth.17 With emphasis on intellectual property assets,
MNEs use software and algorithms to support vital functions of
their business models such as platforms and websites.18
Accordingly, whether the MNE controls or manages its
intangible assets significantly impacts the tax jurisdiction of its
profits.19
Data and User Participation:
Digital companies have increasingly used data collection
and analysis to develop their product offerings and services.20
business model and a key component of its decision-making
process.21 MNEs that analyze comprehensive datasets from
their global customer base for key insights into consumer needs,
operations, product development and marketing activities could
potentially translate this information into real dollars and
profitability.22
For example, digitalized businesses can
concentrate certain online advertisements to specific user groups
through data collection and analytics.23
Digitalized businesses have increasingly used data from
user participation to forecast customer demands and market
trends. In general, user participation is categorized as either
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active or passive.

In passive user participation, the company

without direct activity on the part of the users to enter
information, e.g., cookies, which continue to collect browsing
24
activity even if the user has exited
In
data, which is restricted by the information the user chooses to
share.25 For example, a user bookmarks a page, rates a product,
serreviews, adds friends, creates communities and engages in
networking online (socially or professionally).26 Users may
actively transfer their information for goods and/or services in
return, e.g., email services or digital entertainment.27 Usergenerated content such as reviews aids other platform users in
the selection of goods or services and helps build the trust level
in the platform and brand itself.28 Active participation forms the
basis of social networks as users add friends, attract other users,
data to grow exponentially and results in increased
profitability.29
New Pieces, New Rules: The Focus on Selected Markets in
the Digital Economy
In recent years, a number of jurisdictions have cited
certain user-based, digital activities and markets from which
MNEs derived revenue in these countries in deciding to either
propose or pass legislation to tax the revenue. The business
revenue models of such markets include online advertising,
intermediation services, multi-sided marketplaces and data
transfer services.30 Online advertising targets and delivers
marketing messages to consumers via the internet.31 For
example, search results or webpages include advertising; a
digital platform provides free or discounted content to users in
return for viewing advertisements; advertising is provided via
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and social media websites grow their online community and then
generate revenue from this audience through advertising.32
Meanwhile, data transfer services collect user behavior data for
sale or resale primarily for advertising purposes or customized
market research such as data brokers and data analytics
companies.33
Online intermediation services allow users to sell
services or communicate with other users on their digital
platforms for a fee.34 Examples include financial services such
as brokerages, consulting services, travel agencies, business to
business services that act as online intermediaries for web
hosting, payment processing, platform access, and social
networking and dating websites.35 Online marketplaces are
multi-sided platforms where users can sell tangible goods and/or
services for a fee.36 For example, users purchase or rent digital
content such as e-books, videos, apps, music, games. Online
retailers sell tangible goods or virtual items; online gaming;
subscription fees for digital content such as news, videostreaming, music and software services such as anti-virus
software, data storage, customer service, and the license of
online content and technology such as publications, journals,
cloud-based systems, software, algorithms and artificial
intelligence systems.37
Specifically, the OECD has identified two digital
business categories that have been of particular interest to
market jurisdictions for international tax purposes automated
digital services and consumer-facing businesses. Automated
digital service businesses provide digital services on a
standardized basis to a large customer base or users in multiple
jurisdictions throughout the world remotely with minimal or no
physical presence.38 Examples of such business models include
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gaming; cloud computing services; and online advertising
39
Therefore, certain MNEs can generate significant
revenue in an automated and standardized basis (not only from
sales, but also through the monetization of data) by harnessing
content, and network effects.40
Consumer-facing businesses generate their revenue from
the sale of consumer products and services to individuals for
personal use (i.e., not professional or commercial purposes).41
Consumer-facing business models include businesses that
generate revenue from selling goods and services directly to
customers or indirectly to customers via third party resellers or
intermediaries, and licensing rights of trademarked consumer
goods or a consumer brand. Examples of consumer-facing
sonal computing products (e.g.,
software, home appliances, mobile phones); clothes, toiletries,
cosmetics, luxury goods; branded foods and refreshments;
42
A number of countries
have focused on these user-based activities between their
residents and large U.S. technology companies as a source of
potential and much needed tax revenue.
III. PRESENT LAW
NEXUS AND ALLOCATION OF
PROFITS: TOO MANY PLAYERS COMPETING FOR
THE SAME PRIZE
International tax law has developed widely accepted
principles, which countries have, until recently, followed when
conflicts arose between jurisdictions on the issue of taxing
authority.43 Domestic tax law, treaties and other international
law instruments govern the tax treatment of cross-border
transactions. However, many of these authoritative sources (and
their underlying principles) were drafted well before the digital
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economy of today during a time when cross-border transactions
were labor intensive and involved only tangible assets.44 In
general, current international tax law attaches a taxing right to
the locale where an MNE derives profits from a physical
presence within the jurisdiction.45 Businesses today, however,
have the technological capability to sustain and actively
participate in the economy of multiple market jurisdictions (i.e.,
jurisdictions where the consumers are located rather than the
supply or production side) without an actual local physical
presence.46 Inherent from these technological advances,
digitalization has challenged two fundamental principles in the
taxation of cross-border transactions, i.e., the traditional notions
principle.
Nexus
Nexus is used to determine whether a country has
jurisdiction to tax a non-resident entity. A tax jurisdiction may
impose tax on MNEs who have sufficient nexus, or connection,
(a connection between the MNE and the country), or can be
territorial (a connection between the relevant conduct and the
country, i.e., the country where the conduct subject to tax
occurs).47 Most tax treaties provide that the country of residence
the MNE has nexus carries on a business through a
permanent establishment in another jurisdiction (source
country).48 In general, nexus is established if the MNE has a
49

For
example, an entity that manufactures or maintains retail stores
or runs material operations such as distribution, inventory
management and marketing (brick and mortar) in a foreign
country has a permanent establishment therein.50 However, a
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U.S. company that exports goods to a country abroad and does
not otherwise engage in activities within that foreign country is
establishment to give rise to an imposition of tax on its profits.51
Likewise, the actions of a foreign MNE that merely exports
goods to a country and does not otherwise manufacture or
distribute these goods via a local facility should not give rise to
nexus in that country.52 Thus, under current law, nexus
attributes taxing rights to the country where an MNE physically
conducts its income-producing activity. As such, the current
definition of nexus does not necessarily capture the income
generated by MNEs through digital activities.53
Allocation of Profits
If a jurisdiction establishes nexus, then sourcing rules
54
to
country for tax purposes. A country determines the amount of
source-based taxes on its share of
taxation by where the MNE conducts its activities or where its
property is located.55
principle to the business profits of a resident taxpayer or
business profits attributable to a nonpermanent establishment by analyzing the factors of relevant
56

For U.S. tax purposes,
whether income is U.S. source or foreign source is ascertained
the income.57

For example, U.S. tax law provides that
cal presence
or assets used in the United States is subject to U.S. tax.58 MNEs
with nexus in multiple jurisdictions must determine the amount
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of income allocated, and therefore, subject to tax on a country
by country basis.
Residence-based taxes include income taxes based on a
59
Until recently,
countries resolved conflicts over tax jurisdiction that could result
in double taxation through bilateral tax treaties or legislation,
which allowed MNEs to claim foreign tax credits for taxes paid
to another jurisdiction.60 In response to the digital economy, a
growing number of countries have argued that destination
should serve as the basis to determine the appropriate market
jurisdiction with taxing rights to certain income.61 MNEs are
no longer limited by physical boundaries and can reach their
consumers or provide services in countries where the end user
resides. Specifically, taxing rights for cross-border activities in
the digital age should be allocated among jurisdictions based on
where the economic activities and value creation occur rather
than physical presence.62
Direct Tax Issues
The OECD has identified key tax policy issues in direct
taxation arising from the digital economy including nexus, data
and characterization. First, digital technologies have enabled
MNEs to access consumers and provide goods and services with
relative ease anywhere and at any time in the world. Digital
technology has significantly changed the way MNEs perform
activities such as market research, marketing and advertising,
and customer support by improving the performance of remote
activities; increasing the speed of information collection,
processing and analysis in cross-border activities; and
capitalizing on access to innumerable consumers without the
limitation of physical boundaries.63 MNEs no longer require a
local physical presence or personnel to engage in transactions
with customers and generate profit in multiple jurisdictions.64

57

Moreover, business models that promote continuing interactions
with customers, e.g., websites that enable customers to rate and
review products or services, creates network effects that can
exponentially increase consumer traffic and the value of the
website.65
provide their own content, e.g., Facebook, YouTube, TikTok,
increases value in a cyclical fashion as new users join or existing
users add more content, which subsequently attracts more users
leading to even more content.66 In light of the prevalence and
astronomical growth in technology among businesses that
formerly relied on brick and mortar locations, nations have
questioned whether the current nexus rules (in tax treaties and
domestic tax laws of nonresident entities) should be redefined to
reflect the impact of digitalization little to no physical
presence, more valuable intellectual property, increased network
effects between customers and help alleviate the revenue
strain experienced by governments worldwide.67
Second, digital technology functions without physical
boundaries, and, as such, it has allowed businesses to collect,
extract and analyze consumer data at unprecedented levels.
MNEs, which more often than not operate as multi-sided
business models68
nomy, can collect user
data proactively (i.e., the business requests or requires
consumers or users to furnish their information) or reactively
(i.e., the consumers or users control the nature and amount of
information they submit to the business).69 MNEs can then sell
the user data or use the collected data to add significant value to
their operations by customizing offerings, developing products
and services and targeting advertisements that align with the
data, analyzing results in real-time, streamlining the decisionmaking process.70 However, the advantages are not without
issues as a number of countries have passed data privacy and
challenges abound in tracing the data source and allocating
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profits for tax purposes.71 As a result, nations have questioned
the current nexus rules, valuation and income characterization
as these pertain to data
collection creates nexus in a jurisdiction where it has no physical
presence; how to attribute value to data that MNEs generate
through digital goods and services (in essence, a byproduct of
of data for tax purposes.72
Finally, the new business revenue models73 have raised
issues about the characterization of certain payments for digital
products or delivery of services74 under tax treaties and domestic
law.75 Specifically, whether jurisdictions characterize these
payments as royalties, technical service fees or business profits76
substantially impacts the treatment for tax purposes. For
example, under current international tax law, a jurisdiction
imposes taxes on business profits that are attributable to a
permanent establishment within the country whereas royalties
77
may be subjec
Accordingly, nations have questioned whether the existing
character of income rules, which may produce different tax
results for essentially similar transactions, sufficiently captures
the reverberating tax effects of the digital economy. The
character of income has significant implications not only for
purposes of determining the tax treatment of such income but
also the allocation of taxing rights between multiple
jurisdictions, and of course, nexus.78 With growing sentiment
among nations that certain technology companies must pay their
agencies to raise revenue, certain countries declined to wait
while nations deliberate and negotiate a consensus, and instead,
opted to proceed with self-help measures in the form of digital
services taxes.
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IV. DIGITAL SERVICES TAXES: PLAYERS DECLINE
THE STATUS QUO
Certain countries have taken unilateral measures and
imposed a digital services tax on MNEs in certain sectors of the
digital economy. Countries have argued in frustration over the
revenue should be reallocated to the jurisdictions where their
customers reside for tax purposes. Countries further argue that
models by contributing content and reviews, purchasing goods
and more, these countries have the right to impose digital
services tax on certain MNEs.79 Indeed, some countries have
proposed, announced or implemented digital services taxes on
the gross revenue of MNEs who reach a requisite level of
80
te
However, these unilateral measures may impair the international
tax regime by their emphasis on non-income taxes, which are
not creditable nor subject to tax treaties.81 Meanwhile, other
countries contend that DSTs undermine existing international
tax policy and target a disparate number of MNEs who have
digital transactions and/or online activities with businesses or
consumers in other countries without physical presence
therein.82 Specifically, the U.S. argues that digital services taxes
disproportionately target large U.S. technology MNEs (i.e.,
GAFA), and consequently, impacts U.S. commerce.83

For example, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
that have
adopted a digital services tax ranging from 2% to 10% and
generally based on minimum revenue thresholds from digital
activities for covered services such as online intermediary or
advertising services, online marketplaces, digital interface
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services and social media: Austria, France, India, Italy, Spain,
Turkey, United Kingdom.84 The following countries are
considering a DST: Brazil (1 to 5%), Canada (3%), Czech
Republic (7%) and the European Union (3%).85 As countries
grapple with the effects of the pandemic, more countries will
certainly look to the digital economy as a source of untapped
revenue. In an effort to cease current and prevent future
unilateral tax measures that could lead to double taxation,
potential animosity and retaliatory responses between
under Pillar One to address issues concerning nexus and the
allocation of taxing rights. A significant part of this agreement
requires jurisdictions to remove all digital services taxes and
other relevant
not only the companies that are in-scope).86 Moreover, the
jurisdictions must pledge that they will not introduce such
unilateral measures in the future.87 Interestingly, although the
United States at the federal level has vehemently opposed digital
services taxes as targeting U.S. technology companies, certain
states within the union are considering imposing a digital tax on
companies (e.g., digital advertising, social media advertising,
sale of consumer data), which in and of itself can raise a whole
host of legal, administrative and economic issues if not properly
designed.88
V. OECD PILLAR ONE: MANY PLAYERS UNITE
AND COLLABORATE FOR THE GOOD OF THE
GAME
On October 12, 2020, the OECD issued its Report on the
Blueprint of Pillar One89 as part of its continued effort in BEPS
Action 190 to modernize international tax to better align with the
91
As a
result of the advances in digital technology, business models
have emerged that leverage this technology and enable MNEs to
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actively participate and generate profits in market jurisdictions
without an actual local physical presence.92 In light of
key purpose of Pillar One is to provide a framework toward
global agreement in adapting the existing rules of nexus and
profit allocation in favor of expanding the taxing rights of
market jurisdictions.93
In essence, Pillar One proposes a
paradigm shift from existing fundamental international tax
principles to a new taxing right that redefines nexus rules and
gives market jurisdictions the right to tax an allocated portion of
profits generated by in-scope companies. Pillar One consists of
three primary elements that is, Amount A,94 Amount B,95 and
dispute prevention and resolution mechanisms96 to bolster tax
certainty. Generally speaking, Amount A is the allocated
portion of the inmarket jurisdiction that exceeds a routine return of baseline
activities for marketing and distribution (Amount B).
On July 1, 2021, the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework
broad architecture and released its Statement on a Two-Pillar
Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the
Digitalisation of the Economy.97 On October 8, 2021, the
Inclusive Framework issued a revised statement, which includes
a detailed implementation plan of this agreement.98 As of
November 4, 2021, 137 member countries have agreed to key
components of Pillar One and further call for a Multilateral
Convention through which countries will implement Amount
A.99 A consensus between most of the Inclusive Framework
members is a monumental step toward international tax reform,
and was likely no small feat given the varying interests, sense of
fairness and political objectives of each country. International
tax inherently depends on multilateral cooperation between
countries, and the OECD has been pivotal in the establishment
of the Inclusive Framework and ongoing negotiations for
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international tax reform.100 The OECD anticipates that a
Multilateral Convention (through which Amount A is
implemented along with changes in domestic law as needed to
effectuate the new taxing rights101) will be opened for signature
in 2022 and Amount A will come into effect in 2023.102 To
provide insight and a deeper understanding of the recent
evolution of Pillar One toward a consensus-based solution, the
transformative elements (scope, nexus, reallocation of income,
revenue sourcing) of (1) the proposals under the Pillar One
Blueprint to (2) the agreement reached (and implicitly the
-Pillar
Solution for the new taxing right. The remaining subsections
then briefly discuss Amount B, Tax Certainty, Implementation
and Timeframe. While the OECD statement builds and resolves
key issues in the Blueprint proposals, it also highlights
significant differences that further underscores the magnitude of
this agreement between most of the Inclusive Framework
members.
Amount A
Scope:
Amount A pertains to the new taxing right that market
jurisdictions can impose on the deemed residual profit of an
MNE group (or segment, as applicable).103 This new taxing
allocation.104 To determine Amount A, a formula is applied to
nexus rules have the right to tax the allocation. Importantly, the
new taxing right applies only to MNE groups within the defined
scope of Amount A. The Pillar One Blueprint used activity tests
(in-scope activities) and threshold tests to determine scope,
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whereas the OECD Statement shifts away from determining
scope by activity and instead bases scope on the profitability of
the MNEs.
Pillar One Blueprint: Activity Tests
In-scope activities are
divided into two categories, i.e., automated digital services and
consumer-facing businesses.105 The purpose (and tax policy
objective) of the activity tests is to capture the income of MNEs
who participate in the economy of a market jurisdiction remotely
marketing, collection and use of data without a commensurate
taxable presence (i.e., local physical presence) under present
law.106
Automated digital services are generally defined as
services that are automated (after set-up, the service requires
minimal human involvement by the service provider) and digital
(via the internet or electronic network).107 Moreover, Pillar One
provides a positive list of automated digital services and a
negative list of non-automated digital services (therefore,
excluded) for clarification.108 If an activity does not qualify for
either list, then the conditions under the general definition is
applied.109 It is important to note that although a service may
not be considered an automated digital service under the activity
test pur
in-scope as a consumer-facing business 110
Consumer-facing businesses are generally defined as
businesses that produce revenue from the sale of goods and
services of a type commonly sold to consumers, including
indirect sales through intermediaries (such as businesses that
operate via brokers, third party distributors or other
intermediaries) as well as through franchising and licensing.111
Furthermore, a consumer-facing business is an MNE that (1)
owns the consumer product or service and holds the rights to the
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connected intangible asset including franchisors and licensors or
(2) a retailer or contractual party of the consumer.112 Consumerfacing businesses do not include third party MNEs with no
customer relationship, e.g., manufacturers, wholesalers and
distributors.113 The Blueprint provided that certain industries
are excluded (out of scope) from Amount A such as certain
natural resources; certain financial services; construction, sale
and leasing of residential property; and international air and
shipping businesses.114
Threshold Tests
The Pillar One Blueprint includes
two threshold tests, i.e., the global revenue test and de minimis
foreign in-scope test.115 An MNE is in-scope of Amount A only
if its consolidated revenue and its foreign in-scope revenue (in
-scope revenue earned outside of its
domestic market) exceeds certain thresholds. The gross revenue
whose annu
consolidated financial statements is below the threshold and
thereby hones in on the largest MNEs with residual profit for
reallocation.116
The de minimis foreign in-scope test applies to MNEs
that surpass the gross revenue threshold, but have only minimal
foreign-source revenue that is in-scope.117 First, an MNE
determines whether the total amount of its in-scope revenue
from automated digital services and consumer facing business
activities exceeds the threshold under this test.118 MNEs who
earn less than the threshold are exempt.119 Second, the MNE
determines whether this in-scope revenue above the threshold
amount is derived from foreign in-scope activities
that is,
t.120 Accordingly,
the purpose of the de minimis test is to exclude MNEs with a
small amount of foreign in-scope revenue because the profits
reallocated under Amount A to market jurisdictions would be
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negligible.121 In other words, this test excludes an MNE whose
revenue is primarily from its domestic market from the scope
under Amount A.122 The Blueprint also provided that certain
industries are carved-out123 and excluded from the reach of Pillar
One such as construction, extractives, financial services,
international airline and shipping, and sale and leasing of
residential property.124
Understandably, many jurisdictions were put off by the
complexity of the proposed scope rules in the Blueprint,
including segmentation by business lines or geography,125 and
recognized the difficulty of defining in-scope automated digital
services and consumer-facing businesses. Furthermore, the U.S.
criticized these proposals as discriminatory toward U.S.
multinational technology companies, which the U.S. views as
the direct targets of these measures.
Two-Pillar Solution Statement:
Threshold for Large
Companies and Profitability The OECD Statement issued on
October 8
toward seismic changes in global tax policy and fundamental
international tax principles (i.e., nexus based on a physical
presence establishing the right to tax) that have prevailed over
the last one hundred years. The OECD Statement describes a
phased approach whereby MNEs with global turnover
exceeding twenty billion euros and a profit-to-revenue ratio (i.e.,
profit before tax divided by revenue on a book basis) greater than
ten percent
are
126
considered in-scope companies. Depending on the successful
implementation of Amount A (including dispute prevention and
resolution mechanisms), the global threshold is then expected to
be reduced to ten billion euros after a relevant review period,127
thus substantially increasing the number of in-scope companies.
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The OECD Statement indicates a drastic shift away from
determining scope by types of businesses that are seemingly
industry specific (automated digital services or consumerfacing) to instead focusing on profitability and size.128 Simply
share of taxes in the jurisdictions where the MNEs sell their
goods or services regardless of actual physical presence in the
market jurisdiction, industry classification or business model.
Certain businesses derive a significant amount of their profits
from intangible assets, which do not require a physical presence
in market jurisdictions to generate these profits. Accordingly,
Amount A should enable market jurisdictions to tax the profits
of in-scope businesses. In stark contrast to the Blueprint, the
Statement carves-out only extractive industries (i.e., natural
resources) and regulated financial services as exclusions from
Amount A.129 Commentators have reported that approximately
one hundred companies are in-scope und
130
This change in methodology is
based on a proposal put forth by the Biden Administration131 to
irrespective of their activities. The U.S. also sought to minimize
the exclusions from Amount A. In recent years, the U.S. has
vigorously argued that previous proposals (regarding automated
digital services and consumer-facing businesses) and digital
services taxes discriminate against U.S. MNEs in particular,
the behemoth U.S. technology companies of Amazon, Alphabet,
Apple, Facebook and Microsoft.
Segmentation
Segmentation (i.e., identifying and
segmenting in-scope businesses) was a key open issue132 during
the Blueprint stage and contributed to the potential complexity
of the proposal. The Statement, however, indicates that
and if a segment itself meets the revenue and profitability scope
thresholds133
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financial statements.134 In other words, an MNE that does not
meet the revenue and profitability thresholds on a consolidated
basis may, nonetheless, be subject to Pillar One if a segment
itself exceeds the thresholds. The OECD found that MNEs
operate digital and non-digital business lines and therefore,
segmentation is required to determine the profit associated with
the digital business lines. Pursuant to U.S. Generally Accepted
are required to report a segment that accounts for ten percent of
their total revenue, total profits or total assets.135 International
reporting rules for segments.136
Nexus:
The special nexus rule to determine the market
axing right under Pillar One is a significant
departure from existing law based on physical presence. The
sole purpose of the new nexus rules is to determine a market
137
The
new nexus rules are a standalone provision and do not alter
nexus for other tax or non-tax purposes that is, jurisdictions
cannot use the new nexus rules to establish nexus for any other
taxes, non-tax purposes or customs duties.138 The new nexus
rules are based on indicators to evaluate whether an in-scope
MNE has a significant and sustained engagement with market
reallocated to such countries under Amount A.139
Pillar One Blueprint: The proposed nexus rules contained in
the Blueprint distinguished between nexus for automated digital
services and nexus for consumer-facing businesses. The
Blueprint determines nexus for automated digital services solely
scope revenue (e.g., revenue in excess of EUR X million per

68 / Vol 42 / North East Journal of Legal Studies

year).140 Because the very nature of automated digital services
enables MNEs to provide these services remotely to a market
jurisdiction in a significant and sustained manner without a
physical presence, the Blueprint provides that only the revenue
threshold test should be required to determine nexus for
automated digital services.141 In contrast, the Blueprint places a
higher nexus standard for consumer-facing businesses because
their ability to engage remotely in market jurisdictions is less
evident.142 The Blueprint determines nexus for consumerfacing businesses by applying a market revenue threshold to the
-scope revenue (e.g., revenue in excess of EUR
X million per year) and
in a jurisdiction to determine nexus.143 The Blueprint identifies
examples of plus factors such as a subsidiary or permanent
establishment that carries out activities related to in-scope sales
in the market jurisdiction.144 Moreover, if an MNE group
segments its business lines to determine Amount A, then nexus
is determined at the segment level.145
Amount A
Quantum
The Blueprint describes a
complex three-step formula (that does not apply the arms-length
principle) to calculate the Amount A quantum, which can be
applied either through a profit-based approach (e.g., Amount A
tax base as an absolute profit of EUR 10 million) or a profitmargin approach (Amount A tax base as profit before tax to
revenue of 15%).146 Step 1 is a profitability threshold based on
a profit before tax to revenue ratio, which is intended to isolate
the residual profit subject to reallocation. Step 2 is a reallocation
percentage used to identify the allocable tax base, i.e., a fixed
percentage share of residual profit (actual profits less the
profitability threshold) allocated to the market jurisdictions.
Lastly, Step 3 employs an allocation key based on locally
sourced in-scope revenue to distribute the allocable tax base
among the market jurisdictions with nexus.147 The Amount A
tax base is calculated using profit before tax from the MNE
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or GAAP that produce equal or comparable outcomes to
IFRS.148 The following simplified formula of Amount A from
the OECD provides insight into its calculation under the
Blueprint and OECD Statement as well.149
Tax Revenue Change in Jurisdiction A equals:
A
Global
residual
profit inscope

x

B
Reallocation
%

x

C
( Jurisdiction
A Share of
destination
based sales

x

D
Tax rate
applied
by
Jurisdiction A
on
received
profit

-

E
Share of
residual
profit in
Jurisdiction A

x

F
Rate of )
double tax
relief in
Jurisdiction A

Amounts C and D pertain to the tax revenue a country
receives because of the reallocation of residual profit, whereas
E and F pertain to the tax revenue a country loses in the
reallocation.150
Two-Pillar Solution Statement: For the purpose of determining
distinction between automated digital services and consumerfacing businesses (e.g., plus factors) to only a threshold test
based on the sales of an MNE within the market jurisdiction.151
The Statement provides a new special purpose nexus that is, a
market jurisdiction is deemed to have taxable presence nexus
when an in-scope MNE derives at least EUR 1 million in
revenue from that market jurisdiction.152 In other words, a
market jurisdiction can impose tax on an in-scope nonresident
company if it meets the EUR 1 million threshold. Therefore, a
allocated to that market jurisdiction. This new special nexus that
relies on consumer activities in market jurisdictions is a drastic
departure from traditional international tax rules for nexus based
on physical presence. For smaller jurisdictions with gross
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domestic product lower than EUR 40 billion, this threshold is
lowered to EUR 250,000 in revenue.153 This lower revenue
threshold supports the argument that smaller economies may
require different thresholds. The special purpose nexus applies
solely to decide whether a market jurisdiction is entitled to the
Amount A allocation and cannot otherwise establish nexus for
other tax purposes.154
Amount A Quantum Once nexus is established for
an in-scope MNE, the quantum of Amount A allocated to market
jurisdictions (that possess the special nexus) is twenty-five
percent of residual profits, and therefore, effectively places a
floor on Amount A.155 The Statement defines residual profit as
or segmented basis) based on financial accounting income.156
Furthermore, Amount A will be allocated to market jurisdictions
157
It is important to note
of book-to-tax adjustments will be a key determinant of scope
and applying Amount A.158 Either the exemption method or the
credit method will be used to provide relief from double taxation
of profits allocated to a market jurisdiction under Amount A.159
Otherwise, two jurisdictions (residence jurisdiction under
existing tax rules and market jurisdiction via the new taxing
right) could subject one taxpayer to tax on the same income in
Amount A.160 Where an in-scope MNE already has residual
profits taxed in a market jurisdiction, a safe harbor mechanism
will cap the Amount A quantum allocated to the market
jurisdiction.161
Revenue Sourcing:
The revenue sourcing rules determine which specific
market jurisdiction the revenue is derived from for purposes of
applying scope, nexus and the Amount A allocations. The
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sourcing rules attempt to balance the need for accuracy with the
in-scope MNEs ability to comply without significant
compliance costs.
Pillar One Blueprint: The Blueprint provides detailed revenue
sourcing rules that distinguish in treatment between automated
digital services and consumer-facing businesses. These two
broad categories are then further differentiated between business
models and ultimately by revenue streams.
The specific
sourcing principles for each in-scope activity is supplemented
by a hierarchy of indicators that the MNE can use to locate the
source jurisdiction,162 e.g., geolocation, IP address, vi
number.163
The Blueprint also provides guidance for
documentation that the MNEs maintain information at the
systemic level data via a robust internal control framework (not
164
a record of all dat
documentation is subject to review by tax administrations.165
Two-Pillar Solution Statement:
sourcing rules based on automated digital services and
consumer-facing businesses (indicators and hierarchy of
methods), the OECD Statement provides that revenue will be
sourced to the end market jurisdictions
that is, the location
where the end users use or consume the goods or services.166
Detailed source rules will be developed for categories of
transactions to facilitate this broad principle.167 During this
challenging time of increased competition for tax revenue, these
sourcing rules may become a point of contention between tax
authorities as each vies for a larger piece of the pie. Moreover,
the in-scope
circumstances.168
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Amount B
Amount B would apply to MNEs with existing
traditional nexus (i.e., physical presence, thereby, excluded from
the new taxing right under Amount A) in the market
jurisdiction.169 The purpose of Amount B is to standardize
intercompany pricing of related party distributors that perform
jurisdiction.170 The distributors perform such activities in a
manner that is consistent with the arms-length principle.171 The
framework of Amount B would assign a fixed return for certain
baseline distribution and marketing functions.172 In other words,
Amount B is an allocation based on the arms-length principle to
in-country marketing and distribution activities. The OECD
Statement provides that the application of Amount B will be
simplified and streamlined and sets a different timetable from
Amount A that is, the end of 2022 to finalize this technical
work.173
Tax Certainty
Dispute prevention and resolution mechanisms
(mandatory and binding in nature) will be available to in-scope
MNEs for issues pertaining to Amount A such as transfer pricing
and business profits disputes.174 Disputes about whether an
issue relates to Amount A will be resolved through mandatory
and binding arbitration without delaying the substantive dispute
process.175 Although the dispute resolution mechanism is
generally mandatory, certain developing countries can instead
elect this binding dispute resolution mechanism only for issues
related to Amount A.176
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Implementation and Timeframe
The Inclusive Framework released an implementation
plan that describes the work required to implement Pillar One.177
The Inclusive Framework will develop a Multilateral
Convention and its Explanatory Statement, which provides a
multilateral framework of rules to calculate and allocate Amount
A and eliminate double taxation and the processes for
administration, exchange of information, and mandatory and
binding dispute prevention and resolution.178 Lastly, the OECD
Statement puts forth an aggressive timetable by any standards to
implement Pillar One. Critics argue that Pillar One does not
accomplish enough for developing countries, does not ensure tax
certainty for MNEs and remains overly complex.179 Although
the OECD issued an implementation plan of the Inclusive
agreement on October 8, 2021, anticipates the text
of the Multilateral Convention and its Explanatory Statement in
framework.180 Both sides

taxing jurisdictions and MNEs

resulting changes in domestic tax law and multilateral
agreements including the additional costs associated with
implementation, compliance, administration and collection.
VI. U.S. TAX POLICY: WHO MAKES THE RULES
NOW, AND WHAT IF NO ONE AGREES?
Digital technology and the corresponding success of
U.S.-based technology companies have strained U.S. relations
with other developed nations that have failed to capitalize on
their own technology industry and where the digital economy
remains largely untapped.181 Pillar One can be detrimental to
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resident country of the largest technology companies in the
world and allows a foreign tax credit. 182 Accordingly, the U.S.
(under the prior administration) had originally proposed to the
Inclusive Framework an elective safe harbor that would enable
MNEs to opt-in for purposes of Pillar One to protect
183
However, this safe
harbor, unsurprisingly, was met with much resistance from other
countries.184
In April 2021, the U.S. under the new
administration reversed course from the safe harbor proposal
and in
185
As proposed by the U.S. Treasury Department to
the Inclusive Framework, comprehensive scoping would be
based on a revenue threshold and profit margins such that only
-scope under Pillar
One irrespective of industry or business model, and therefore,
would not solely target U.S.-based digital giants.186 The purpose
of comprehensive scoping would be to ensure that MNEs with
the most profit, intangible assets and inclination to shift profits
from high-tax to low- or no-tax jurisdictions are in-scope for
purposes of Pillar One.187 Ultimately, as discussed above, the
Inclusive Framework appears to have adopted this concept of
comprehensive scoping as well as commitment to binding
dispute prevention and resolution mechanisms.188 Although the
Biden Administration submitted proposals to the Inclusive
Framework that moved Pillar One forward beyond the safe
harbor impasse, the Biden Administration revenue proposals
did not address legislative implementation of Pillar One from a
domestic tax perspective.189
e
unilateral measures that have resulted in heightened trade
tensions, particularly the digital services taxes, which the U.S.
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views as directly targeted against U.S. technology companies
and spurred by the all too obvious political impetus of
jurisdictions to increase their tax revenues.190 The USTR
concluded its investigations of digital services taxes in certain
countries (i.e., Austria, France, India, Italy, Spain, Turkey and
the United Kingdom) and determined that these digital services
191

The USTR initially planned to
impose a tariff of twenty-five percent on the products of these
countries by November 29, 2021.192 Pursuant to the Inclusive
in Pillar One, the USTR has since
terminated actions from its investigations of Austria, France,
India, Italy, Spain, Turkey and United Kingdom based on each
its DSTs.193 However, the
USTR will continue to monitor the removal of DSTs,
implementation of the Two-Pillar Solution and associated
measures.194
The OECD estimates that approximately $100 billion of
profit could be reallocated to market jurisdictions pursuant to the
new taxing right of Pillar One.195 As a result, the OECD
projects a modest increase in global tax revenues, and more
specifically, it estimates that low, middle and high income
economies on average will acquire revenue gains,196 whereas
197
will forego tax revenues.198 United States
Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has indicated that Pillar One

199
proposed profit reallocatio
A commentator, however,
estimates that Pillar One will cost the U.S. $10.3 billion in
revenue per year (i.e., revenue gain of $12.6 billion less $22.9
billion from credit offsets).200 Another commentator argued that
argest and most profitable
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as the U.S. Treasury because these MNEs will pay less to the
Internal Revenue Service and more to foreign governments.201
According to a policy brief from the Oxford Centre for Business
Taxation, commentators suggest that Pillar One will impact only
seventy-eight of the five hundred largest companies globally.202
Furthermore, they estimate that the total reallocation for Amount
A is $87 billion203 from these companies, and of which, U.S.based companies will generate approximately $56 billion;
technology companies will generate approximately $39 billion
of the total; and the five largest U.S. technology companies (i.e.,
Alphabet, Apple, Facebook, Intel and Microsoft) will generate
approximately $28 billion of the total.204 Nonetheless, the scope
rules described in the OECD Statement will subject more
European companies and more businesses across sectors to tax
than the Blueprint version.205
At the time of writing, Pillar One
may
prove challenging in the U.S. Congress as certain members have
expressed opposition to its policies, and thus, creates political
uncertainty.206 Because Pillar One will impact existing bilateral
treaties, commentators have argued that its implementation will
Multilateral Convention and potentially a new international tax
treaty by Senate ratification (two-thirds majority vote).207 U.S.
Treasury Secretary Yellen has indicated that the current

should generate bipartisan support because it replaces DSTs.208
Consequently, the U.S. still finds itself in a precarious balancing
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meanwhile resolutely protecting the sizable tax base generated
by U.S.-based digital giants.209
VII. CONCLUSION
At the time the international tax framework was
established a century ago, no one envisioned the technological
capabilities of present day (the drafters certainly did not
anticipate Facebook, TikTok, YouTube, Instagram and so forth)
along with the vast opportunities afforded to businesses as a
result. The digital economy has raised a number of issues and
challenges in the area of international tax. Because the digital
economy relies heavily on intangible assets, the collection and
use of data (particularly, personal data), user-generated content
and participation, and multi-sided business models, the
fundamental international tax concepts of source and residence
and/or the character of income are more challenging to apply and
increase the risks of base erosion and profit shifting.210 The
OECD and G20 have grappled in more recent years with the
fundamental questions the digital economy has raised in terms
of source and residence, nexus, and the characterization of
income (formerly, widely accepted principles) for international
tax purposes.
Meanwhile, certain countries have acted
unilaterally to impose digital services taxes under mounting
pressure to raise tax revenue and a growing sentiment that
211

The OECD Statement puts forth an aggressive timetable
by any standards to implement Pillar One. Pillar One, in
essence, proposes drastic departures (a new taxing right, new
nexus and reallocation of profits to market jurisdictions) from
traditional international tax principles toward a much needed
evolution of the international framework. Although the OECD
provided an implementation plan of this agreement on October
8, 2021 (anticipates a Multilateral Convention in 2022 and
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effective date in 2023), there is still considerable work to flesh
, which will
reallocate much needed income to market jurisdictions while
impacting a relatively small quantity of MNEs. Both sides
taxing jurisdictions and MNEs
must grapple with the
domestic tax law and multilateral agreements including the
additional costs associated with compliance, administration and
collection. Although the agreement between most members of
the Inclusive Framework is a monumental accomplishment,
there is still considerable work that remains (including
negotiations with the remaining holdout countries) and
continued multilateral cooperation required before the
manifested in the new taxing right, new nexus and tax
allocation rules take effect and enable tax jurisdictions to reap
the benefits around the globe.
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